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Abstract: The Great Depression spurred State ownership in Western capitalist countries. 
Germany was no exception; the last governments of the Weimar Republic took over firms 
in diverse sectors. Later, the Nazi regime transferred public ownership and public services 
to the private sector. In doing so, they went against the mainstream trends in the Western 
capitalist countries, none of which systematically reprivatized firms during the 1930s. 
Privatization in Nazi Germany was also unique in transferring to private hands the delivery 
of public services previously provided by government. The firms and the services 
transferred to private ownership belonged to diverse sectors. Privatization was part of an 
intentional policy with multiple objectives and was not ideologically driven. As in many 
recent privatizations, particularly within the European Union, strong financial restrictions 
were a central motivation. In addition, privatization was used as a political tool to enhance 
support for the government and for the Nazi Party. 
Key words: Privatization, Public Enterprise, Nazi Economy, Germany 
JEL classification: G38, L32, L33, N44 
 
Resumen: Arrel de la Gran Depressió la propietat pública va créixer al països capitalistes 
occidentals. Alemanya no va ser una excepció; els darrers governs de la República de 
Weimar van agafar el control d’empreses en diferent sectors. Més tard, el règim Nazi va 
transferir propietat pública i serveis públics al sector privat. Amb això, els Nazis es situaven 
contra les tendències habituals als països capitalistes occidentals, puix cap altre país va 
reprivatitzar sistemàticament en la dècada dels 1930s. La privatització a l’Alemanya Nazi 
també va ser única en la mesura en què es va transferir a organitzacions privades la 
producció de serveis públics que abans havien estat produïts per l’administració pública. 
Les empreses i serveis transferits al sector privat pertanyen a diferents sectors. La 
privatització va ser part d’una política intencional amb múltiples objectius, i no va tenir un 
caràcter marcadament ideològic. Igual que en moltes privatitzacions recents, especialment a 
la Unió Europea, la motivació principal procedia de les fortes restriccions financeres dels 
pressupostos públics. A més, la privatització va ser usada com un instrument polític per 
augmentar el suport al govern i al Partit Nazi. 
Palabras claves: Privatització, Empresa Pública, Economia Nazi, Alemanya 
Clasificación JEL: G38, L32, L33, N44 
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I. Introduction 
 
Privatization of large parts of the public sector was one of the defining policies 
of the last quarter of the twentieth century. The privatizations in Chile and the 
United Kingdom, implemented in the 1970s and 1980s, are usually considered the 
first privatization policies in modern history (e.g. Yergin and Stanislaw, 1998, 
p.115). A few researchers find earlier instances: Some economic analyses of 
privatization (e.g. Megginson, 2005, p. 15) identify partial sales of state-owned 
firms in Adenauer’s Germany in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the first large-
scale privatization program, and others argue that, though confined to just one 
sector, the denationalization of steel and coal in the United Kingdom during the 
early 1950s should be considered the first privatization (e.g. Burk, 1988; 
Megginson and Netter, 2003, p. 31). 
None of the contemporary economic analyses of privatization takes into account 
an important, earlier case: the privatization policy implemented by the National 
Socialist (Nazi) Party in Germany. The modern literature on privatization, the 
recent literature on the twentieth-century German economy (e.g. Braun, 2003) and 
the history of Germany’s publicly owned enterprises (e.g. Wengenroth, 2000) all 
ignore this early privatization experience. Some authors occasionally mention the 
re-privatization of banks but make no further comment or analysis (e.g. Barkai, 
1990, p. 216; James, 1995, p. 291). Other works, like Hardach (1980, p. 66) and 
Buchheim and Scherner (2005, p. 17), mention the sale of State-owned firms in 
Nazi Germany only to support the idea that the Nazi government opposed 
widespread state ownership of firms and do not carry out any analysis of these 
privatizations.  
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It is a fact that the government of the Nazi Party sold off public ownership in 
several State-owned firms in the mid-1930s. These firms belonged to a wide range 
of sectors: steel, mining, banking, local public utilities, shipyards, ship-lines, 
railways, etc. In addition, the delivery of some public services that were produced 
by government prior to the 1930s, especially social and labor-related services, was 
transferred to the private sector, mainly to organizations within the party. In the 
1930s and 1940s, many academic analyses of Nazi economic policy discussed 
privatization in Germany (e.g. Poole, 1939; Guillebaud, 1939; Stolper, 1940; 
Sweezy, 1941; Merlin, 1943; Neumann, 1942, 1944; Nathan, 1944a; Schweitzer, 
1946; Lurie,1947).1  
Most of the enterprises transferred to the private sector at the Federal level had 
come into public hands in response to the economic consequences of the Great 
Depression. Many scholars have pointed out that the Great Depression spurred 
State ownership in Western capitalist countries (e.g. Aharoni, 1986, pp. 72 and ff.; 
Clifton, Comín and Díaz Fuentes, 2003, p. 16; Megginson, 2005, pp. 9-10), and 
Germany was no exception. But Germany was alone in developing a policy of 
privatization in the 1930s. Therefore a central question remains: Why did the Nazi 
regime depart from the mainstream policies regarding State ownership of firms? 2 
Why did Germany’s government transfer firms and public functions to the private 
sector while the other Western countries did not?   
                                                 
1 Other less academic works from this period also comment on the privatization in Nazi Germany 
[e.g. Reimann (1939) and Heiden (1944)].  
2 A recurring question in the literature on Nazi economic policy is why the Nazis refrained from 
implementing a policy of wide-scale nationalization of private firms [See Buchheim and Scherner 
(2005) for a recent example]. Indeed, this question is interesting since the Nazis’ official 
economic program and their electoral manifestos regularly included this proposal. However, it is 
not a central concern of this paper. It is worth noting that by rejecting large-scale nationalization, 
the Nazi government joined the mainstream in Western capitalist countries, which were, in the 
1930s, more given to intervention through regulation and fiscal policy. As explained in 
Megginson (2005, p. 10), nationalization of private firms was not a major policy in Western 
capitalist countries once the worst of the Great Depression was over. 
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Answering these questions requires an analysis of the objectives of Nazi 
privatization. While some of the analyses in the 1930s and 1940s are valuable, their 
authors lacked the theories, concepts and tools available to us today. The recent 
economic literature has shown the multiplicity of objectives usually targeted by 
privatization policies (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, 1991) and the general and 
widespread priority of financial objectives within the larger framework of multiple 
and coexisting objectives (Yarrow, 1999). In addition, modern theoretical 
developments have provided valuable insights into the motives of politicians 
choosing between public ownership and privatization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) 
and the consequences of each option for political rent seeking, through either 
excess employment or corruption and financial support (Hart, Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). Also, the theoretical literature has provided interesting results concerning 
the use of privatization to obtain political support (Perotti, 1995; Biais and Perotti, 
2002). 
With the analysis of privatization in Nazi Germany this paper seeks to fill a gap 
in the economic literature. On the one hand, I document in detail the course of 
privatization in the period from the Nazi take-over until 1937.3 These limits are 
chosen because all the major reprivatization operations had been concluded before 
the end of 1937. Some of the privatization operations explained in this paper have 
not been previously noted in the literature. On the other hand, analyzing the Nazi 
privatization with modern tools and concepts allows us to conclude that the 
objectives pursued by the Nazi government were multiple. Of particular relevance 
                                                 
3 Choosing this period is also very useful because it permits us to avoid confusion between the 
processes of privatization and Aryanization. As explained by James (2001, p. 38-51), after 1936-
37 there was an intensification of the Aryanization process, in what was a “state-driven 
aryanization.” Many of the largest Jewish-owned businesses had survived until 1938. The anti-
Jewish apogee was reached in November 1938, with the pogrom of the Reichskristallnacht. In 
addition, analyzing Nazi privatization until 1937 avoids confusion with the business processes 
implemented after the annexation of successive territories, beginning with Austria in 1938.  
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were the increased political support and, especially, a combination of increased 
revenue and expenditure relief for the German Treasury. In short, these motives are 
quite similar to those that have driven privatization policies in most EU countries. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I document the Nazi 
privatization policy, and present a quantitative comparison with more recent 
privatizations. Then, I discuss the analyses of Nazi privatization in the economic 
literature of the late 1930s and 1940s. After this, I analyze the objectives of 
privatization policy in Nazi Germany. Finally, I conclude. 
 
II. Selling public ownership. 
 
In an article published in the Der Deutsche Volkswirt in February 1934, Heinz 
Marschner proposed “The reprivatization of urban transportation, which after the 
period of inflation came under public control, especially in the hands of local 
governments.” (Marschner 1934, p. 587, author’s translation). This proposal was 
related to the Nazi government’s support for returning the ownership of urban 
transportation back to the private sector. Several months later, in an article 
discussing banking policy in Germany, Hans Baumgarten (1934, p. 1645) analyzed 
the conditions required for the reprivatization in the German banking sector. 
Discussion of privatization was increasingly common soon after the Nazi 
government took office early in 1933, and privatizations soon followed. 
 Railways: In the 1930s The Deutsche Reichsbahn (German Railways) was the 
largest single public enterprise in the world (Macmahon and Dittmar 1939, p. 484), 
bringing together most of the railways services operating within Germany. The 
German Budget for fiscal year 1934/35, the last one published (Pollock, 1938, p. 
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121), established that Railway preference shares4 worth Reichsmark (Rm.) 224 
million were to be sold.5 
 Steel and mining: In 1932, the German government bought more than 120 
million marks of shares in Gelsenkirchen Bergbau (Gelsenkirchen Mining 
Company), the strongest firm inside the Vereinigte Stahlwerke A.G. (United 
Steelworks).6 At that time, the United Steel Trust was the second largest joint-stock 
company in Germany (the largest was Farben Industrie A.G.). The state took over 
the shares at 364 percent of their market value (Wengenroth, 2000, p. 115). A range 
of reasons has been given for the nationalization: a) to have effective control over 
the United Steel Trust (The Economist, July 8, 1933, 117 (4689), p. 73), b) to 
socialize costs derived from the effects of the Great Depression (Neumann, 1944, p. 
297): and c) to prevent foreign capital taking over the firm (Wengenroth, 2000, p. 
115). 
Soon after the Nazi party came to power, United Steel was reorganized so that 
the government majority stake of 52 per cent was converted into a stake of less than 
25 per cent, no longer sufficient in German law to give the government any 
privileges in company control.7 Fritz Thyssen, who held the leading position in the 
Trust, had been one of only two big industrialists to give support to the Nazi Party 
before it won political dominance (Barkai, 1990, p. 10). In 1936, the Government 
                                                 
4 After the I World War, the Reichsbahn had been reorganized as independent institution and its 
capital had been formally detached from the Reich’s property (Wengenroth, 2000, p. 111). 
Within this context, common shares and preference shares were issued. Common shares were 
direct ownership of the Reich, and most of preferred shares were allocated initially to the Reich. 
The government could then sell these preferred shares (Macmahon and Dittmar, 1940, pp. 35-38).  
5 The Economist, April 7, 1934 [118 (4728), p. 763]. Besides the sale of German Railway shares, 
The Economist also mentioned another sale of public property to be done: “The Reich property, 
which is to be “liquidated” to yield Rm. 300 millions, is not defined.” 
6 The Economist, March 28, 1936 [122 (4831), p. 701].  
7 Külhmann (1934, pp. 391-392) explains the reorganization in detail. 
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sold its block of shares, amounting to about Rm. 100 million, to the United Steel 
Association.8 
The company Vereinigte Oberschlesische Hüttenwerke AG had control of all 
metal production in the Upper Silesian coal and steel industry. The Seehandlung 
(Prussian state bank) owned 45 per cent of this firm. The remaining shares were 
owned by Castellengo-Abwehr, one of the major Upper Silesian coal mines. 
Castellengo’s capital was owned by Ballestrem. In mid 1937, the state’s Rm. 6.75 
million of shares were sold to Castellengo.9  
Banking: Before the crash of 1929, publicly owned commercial banks accounted 
for at least 40 per cent of the total assets of all banks (Stolper 1940, p. 207), and 
one of the five big commercial banks, the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft, was publicly 
owned. The state was involved in the reorganization of the sector after the bank 
crash in 1931 with an investment of about Rm. 500 million (Ellis, 1940, p. 22), and 
most of the big banks came under state control. Estimates made before the Banking 
Inquiry Committee in 1934 by Hjalmar Schacht, president of the Reichsbank and 
Minister of Economy, stated that around 70 per cent of all German corporate banks 
were controlled by the Reich (Sweezy, 1941, p. 31). Through the Reich or the 
Golddiskontbank, the government owned significant stakes in the largest banks:10 
38.5 per cent of Deutsche Bank und Disconto-Gesellschaft (Deutsche Bank 
                                                 
8 Kruk (1936a, p. 319) and Reich-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1937, p. 55) 
9 Der Deutsche Volkswirt, July 9, 1937  [11 (41), pp. 2020-21]. 
10 The degree of control exercised by the state in the large commercial banks by means of public 
ownership is open to discussion. Most probably, state interference through ownership varied 
according to the relevance of the publicly owned stake. Whereas interference in the Deutsche 
Bank was relatively slight [Feldman (1995, p. 272), James (2004, p. 45-49)], intervention in the 
Dresdner Bank was intense [James (2001, p. 16), Feldman (2004, p. 23)]. In any case, the reform 
of banking regulation that began with the German Bank Act of 1934 allowed the government to 
exercise a tight control over private banks. Dessauer (1935) provides an extensive explanation of 
the German Bank Act of 1934; Nathan (1944b) adds information on subsequent changes in 
regulation. 
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henceforth), 71 per cent of the Commerz– und Privatbank (Commerz-Bank 
henceforth) and 97 per cent of the capital of Dresdner-Bank. 11 
 The Commerz-Bank was reprivatized through several share sales in 1936-37. 
These shares amounted to Rm. 57 million, and the largest single transaction was a 
sale of Rm. 22 million in October 1936.12 Deutsche Bank was reprivatized in 
several operations effectively implemented in 1935-37. The largest was the 
repurchase in March 1937 of shares still held by the Golddiskontbank. These shares 
amounted to Rm. 35 million and Deutsche Bank placed them among its clients. In 
total, the reprivatization of Deutsche Bank shares amounted to Rm. 50 million.13 
Finally, the Dresdner Bank was also reprivatized in several shares sale in 1936-37. 
These shares amounted to Rm. 141 million, and the largest single sale was of Rm. 
120 million in September 1937.14 
 Ship building. In March 1936, a group of Bremen merchants purchased a block 
of shares in the Deutsche Schiff-und Machinenbau AG Bremen “Deschimag” 
(German Shipbuilding and Engineering Co.). The sale amounted to Rm. 3.6 
million.15    
 Shipping lines. In September 1936 publicly owned shares of the Hamburg-
SüdAmerika shipping company were sold to a Hamburg syndicate.16 The sale of 
                                                 
11 Baumgarten (1937, pp. 826-827). Other relevant stakes of the state in banks were 70 per cent 
of the Allgemeine Deutsche Kreditantstalt, and 66.6 per cent of the Norddeutsche Kreditbank 
(Sweezy, 1941, p. 31). Russell (1935, p. 204-208) offers a detailed analysis of the ownership 
relations between the Reich and the commercial banks.  
12 Kruk (1936a, p. 319), The Economist, April 3, 1937 [127 (4884), p. 16], Reichs-Kredit-
Gesellschaft (1937, p. 55), League of Nations (1937, p. 77), League of Nations (1938, p. 92). 
13 Baumgarten (1937, pp. 826-7)], The Economist, April 3, 1937 [127 (4884), p. 16], League of 
Nations (1938, p. 92). 
14 Baumgarten (1937, pp. 826-7), League of Nations (1938, p. 92), Reimann (1939, p. 181), 
Barkai (1990, p. 216). 
15 Kruk (1936a, p. 319) and Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1937, p. 55).  
16 The ship-owners of Hamburg joined the Nazi party as a group. The head of the oldest shipping 
concern in Hamburg explained to Lochner (1954, p. 220-221) that the decision by the ship-
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shares amounted to Rm. 8.2 million.17 In mid 1937, the publicly owned 
Norddeutscher Lloyd (North German Lloyd), part of the VIAG public holding,18 
sold its remaining shares in the steamship company Hansa Dampf to a consortium 
made up of the Deutsche Bank & Berliner Handels-Gesellschaft. The sale of shares 
amounted to Rm. 5 million.19 
Local public utilities. The Nazi government imposed several types of limitations 
and obstacles on municipally owned enterprises. Since 1935 the municipal firms 
were subject to taxation (Sweezy, 1941, p. 32). Administrative and financial 
requirements were made more restrictive (Marx, 1937, p. 142; Pollock, 1938, p. 
145). Privatization of local public utilities was important from 1935 onwards 
(Sweezy 1940, 394). Data presented in Sweezy (1941, p. 33) on income from 
enterprises owned by municipalities show that in 1934 the revenue was Rm. 494 
million, up from Rm. 481 million in 1933. In 1935 the revenue decreased to Rm. 
456 million, and the decline continued in 1936 to Rm. 360 million. The decrease in 
revenues in 1935 and 1936 occurred while the economy grew. Therefore, it must 
have been the result of a reduction in the number and business of local public 
utilities as a consequence of privatization (Sweezy, 1941, p. 33). 
  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
owners of Hamburg to join the Nazi Party was not out of ideological conviction but to avoid 
interference from the Nazi Party in the business. 
17 Kruk (1936a, p. 319) and Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1937, p. 55).  
18 The Vereinigte Industrie Unternehmungen A. G. of Berlin (VIAG) was the holding concern by 
which the German government controlled its property in banking and industrial undertakings. 
These undertakings comprised the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft, various electrical concerns which 
make the German Government the second largest producer of electricity in Germany; the 
Vereinigte Aluminium-Werke, one of the biggest aluminum producers of the world; and a number 
of other concerns producing bicycles, gun metal, nitrogen, ships, etc. According to The 
Economist [June 16 1934, 118(4738), p. 1308], in contrast to many Government enterprises 
elsewhere, the subsidiaries of VIAG were run on strictly commercial lines, and most of the 
companies always made profits. 
19 Der Deutsche Volkswirt, July 9, 1937  [11 (41), p. 2021]. 
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III. Transferring to private hands the delivery of public services. 
 
Besides the transfer to the private sector of public ownership in firms, the Nazi 
government also transferred many public services (some long established, others 
newly created) to special organizations: either the Nazi party and its affiliates20 or 
other allegedly independent organizations which were set up for a specific purpose 
(Nathan, 1944a, p. 321). In this way, delivery of these services was privatized.21  
Work related services. Die Deutsche Arbeitsfront (German Labor Front) was not 
part of the machinery of the State, but a legally independent organization of the 
Nazi Party (Guillebaud, 1939, p. 194).22 It was in charge of delivering services –
some of them previously delivered by the public administration – such as 
supervision of vocational training, inspection of factories regarding issues of health 
in the workplace, amenities, etc.23 Its ‘recommendations’ were compulsory 
(Guillebaud, 1939, p. 195). Membership, also theoretically voluntary, was in fact 
compulsory. The fees received from the workers and the employees made 
substantial resources available for use by the Labor Front. According to Guillebaud 
(1941, p. 37) its revenue in 1937 was Rm. 360 million. Estimates in Nathan (1944b, 
p. 94) are lower: Rm. 240 million in 1937. Either scenario gave the Labor Front 
huge wealth and political power. 
Social services. Public welfare, largely under the jurisdiction of local and 
district authorities before 1933, was partly transferred by the Nazi government to 
affiliates of the Nazi party, particularly to the Nationalsozialistiche Volkswohlfahrt 
                                                 
20 Pollock (1938, p. 43-68) provides an extensive revision of the organizational characteristics of 
the Nazi Party holding of organizations.  
21 Nathan (1944a, p. 321) also points out that Education no longer remained the exclusive 
function of the public school system, but was moved in part to the Hitler Youth Organization.  
22 Völtzer (135, pp. 4-6) offers a thorough review of the legal configuration of the German Labor 
Front.  
23 It also delivered new services such as the leisure program Strength through Joy (Kraft durch 
Freude). These are of less interest to our analysis. 
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(National Socialist People’s Welfare Organization–NSV). The most important 
activity was the Winterhilfe (Winter Help), the distribution of money and goods 
among the poor. NSV was funded with a fee charged on the earnings of employed 
workers, and with quasi-compulsory levies in cash or in kind from farmers, 
peasants, employers and the middle classes generally (Guillebaud, 1941, pp. 96). 
Financial control of Winter Help was in the hands of the Treasurer of the Nazi 
Party (Pollock, 1938, p. 164), and the compulsory character of the contributions 
was so clear that they have been considered an additional source of fiscal revenues 
(Balogh 1938, 472). In 1933/34 the NSV raised 350 million marks, a figure that 
rose to 408.3 million marks in 1936/37 (Pollock, 1938, p. 138; Guillebaud, 1941, 
pp. 97). Estimates in Nathan (1944b, p. 94) give figures of Rm. 340 in 1934/35 and 
Rm. 370 after 1937. Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1939, p. 101) gives an estimate of 
Rm. 400 million in 1938, according to official statistics. 
As explained in The Banker (1937, p. 171), the German government had 
provided Winter Help before the Nazi regime. A comparison between the 
expenditures of the Reich Winter Relief in 1931 and the Nazi Winter Relief in 1933 
“shows that this new Nazi organisation has not provided in Winter Help more than 
the former contribution made by the Reich alone….Under the Nazi system …. a 
huge apparatus has been created to carry out a service formerly provided as a ‘side-
line’ by private and public bodies.” (p. 171). In short, delivered by private and 
public bodies before the Nazi regime, Winter Help was privatized completely by 
the Nazi government and was transferred to a Party Organization. The funding of 
the service was based on a compulsory scheme of fees and levies. As a result, the 
Reich Budget was relieved of the expenditure that this social service program 
represented. 
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IV. An assessment of the quantitative relevance of Nazi privatization. 
 
In the late 1930s and the early 1940s, academic works that mentioned operations 
of privatization in some detail (e.g. Poole, 1939; Sweezy, 1941; Lurie, 1947) used 
basically one source of documentation: The report Germany’s Economic Situation 
at the Turn of 1936/37, published in English in 1937 by the German State-owned 
bank Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft.24 Page 55 of this report displays summarized 
information about four reprivatizations, affecting the German Shipbuilding and 
Engineering Co., the United Steel Trust, the Hamburg-South American Shipping 
Company, and the Commerz –und Privatbank. The information included the 
approximate date of the operations and, in some cases, the amount of Reichsmarks 
involved.  
As mentioned, the German budget for the fiscal year 1934/35 was the last one 
for which detailed information was published (Pollock, 1938, p. 121) and no 
detailed information on financial operations was published thereafter. With the end 
of detailed public budgets in 1935, Der Deutsche Volkswirt became the primary 
source for information about privatization in Germany. The paper’s editorial page 
was considered a mouthpiece for Hjalmar Schacht,25 appointed head of the 
Reichsbank by Adolf Hitler and then, in 1934, Minister of Economy. Der Deutsche 
Volkswirt provided detailed information on the Ministry’s position on 
reprivatization and its implementation. 26  
                                                 
24 Along with the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1937) report, Sweezy (1941, p. 32) also used the 
League of Nations’ 1938 report Money and Banking 1938, which provided some additional 
information on the reprivatization of banks. As with the information published in Reichs-Kredit-
Gesellschaft (1937), the information provided by the League of Nations usually took news and 
analysis published in Der Deutsche Volkswirt as its source. 
25 The Economist, April 18, 1936 [123 (4834), p. 127] 
26 See, for instance, the editorial page in Der Deutsche Volkswirt, April 9, 1936 [10 (28), p. 
1315]. 
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In fact, two articles published by Max Kruk (1936a, 1936b) in late 1936 
provided the information mentioned in the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1937). The 
information in the earlier article (1936a) provides fuller coverage of the financial 
characteristics of the operations. In addition to this, several articles and news 
reports published in Der Deutsche Volkswirt in 1937 provide information on 
operations of privatization implemented during that year.27 Based on all this 
material, I have been able to compile quantitative information on many of the 
privatizations implemented at the Reich level after the 1934/35 Budget up to the 
end of 1937.  
Table 1 presents an estimate of the proceeds from privatization. This estimate 
inevitably presents minimum amounts, since (1) no detailed information is 
available from the Budget after 1934/35, and (2) some operations may have been 
implemented but would not have appeared in the sources of information used.  
 
 
Table 1. Privatization proceeds in Nazi Germany. April 1934- March 1938. 
Period Proceeds from privatization 
Million Reichsmark (1) 
Fiscal revenues 
Million Reichsmark (2) 
(1) / (2) in % 
1934/35 & 1935/36 242.6 17,877 1.36% 
1936/37 & 1937/38 352.9 25,456 1.39% 
April 1934/March 1938 595.5 43,333 1.37% 
Notes:  * Fiscal years begin in April and end in March  
 * Data are aggregated in biannual periods because the original information does not 
identify the precise fiscal year in which some operations were effective.  
 
Sources: * Privatization revenues: Author’s estimates, based on information published in Der 
Deutsche Volkswirt, Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1937), League of Nations (1938), Baumgarten 
(1937) and Kruk (1936a, 1936b). 
 * Fiscal revenues: Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1939, p. 98). Yearly figures are as follows 
(million Reichsmark): 1934/35: RM 8,223; 1935/36: RM 9,654; 1936/37: RM 11,492; 1937/38: 
RM 13,964. 
 
                                                 
27 For instance, Der Deutsche Volkswirt, July 9, 1937 [11 (41), pp. 2020-21] and Baumgarten 
(1937). 
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Estimates presented in table 1 show that between the fiscal years 1934/35 and 
1937/38 privatization was an important source of revenue for Germany’s Treasury. 
In the period as a whole, privatization proceeds represented almost 1.4 per cent of 
total fiscal revenues. 
How important were privatization proceeds in 1930s Germany? It is not possible 
to compare them with those in other European countries, since German 
privatization policy was an exception. However, it is possible to compare 
Germany’s figures in the mid-thirties with figures from European Union countries 
(the former EU-15) in the late 1990s. For purposes of comparison, we can take the 
period of four fiscal years 1997-2000. We should note that this 4-year period saw 
the highest proceeds from privatization in all the former EU-15 countries except the 
United Kingdom, where privatization had almost finished by the mid-nineties. 
Figure 1 shows the ratio (privatization proceeds/fiscal revenues) in all countries 
in the former EU-15 for the period 1997-2000, as well as for 1934-1937 Germany. 
The ratio is presented as a percentage, and the raw data is presented in table A-1 in 
the appendix. The ratios obtained for Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands,28 Belgium and Germany in this period are well below the Nazi 
Germany figure. Denmark’s ratio is slightly above, and the other nine countries 
clearly exceed Germany’s. Interestingly, in the case of Germany, even though 
1997-2000 was the period with largest absolute proceeds, the ratio is 0.65, which is 
less than half the ratio for Germany in 1934-37. Overall, the relative dimension of 
privatization proceeds in 1934-37 Germany is close to the ratio for the EU-15 in 
1997-2000, at 1.79 per cent.29 
 
                                                 
28 In the case of the Netherlands, there had been major privatization proceeds in 1996. Hence, 
taking a period larger than 1997-2000 would increase the ratio in the Netherlands. This is not the 
case in the other countries in figure 1. As already mentioned, the UK ratio is not comparable. 
29 Leaving out the UK, the EU-14 ratio would be 2.05 per cent. 
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Figure 1:  Privatization Proceeds / Fiscal Revenues
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While sales of public ownership provided revenue, privatization of public 
services was an important source of fiscal relief for the German Treasury, since, as 
explained above, funding for these programs was based on an effectively 
compulsory scheme of fees and levies. Table 2 shows the relative dimension of the 
funds privately managed through programs related to work and to social services. 
Indeed, as a percentage of fiscal revenues the expenditures avoided to the Treasury 
were quite relevant. 
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Table 2 Funds privately managed for delivery of public services. 
Public Service Delivered by Millions of 
Reichsmarks 
Equivalent 
to % Fiscal 
Revenues 
Equivalent to 
% National 
Income 
Work related 
services 
Labor Front     (Min) A       240 2.1% 0.34% 
      (Max) B      360 3.1% 0.51% 
Social services National Socialist Welfare 
Organization NSV 
    (Min) A       370 3.2% 0.52% 
      (Max) B,C   408 3.6% 0.57% 
Notes:  Estimates are for 1937. 
Sources: Author’s estimate, based on: 
 Funds managed: A Nathan (1944b); B Guillebaud (1941); C Pollock (1938). 
     Fiscal revenues and National Income: Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1939). 
 
 
 
The fiscal importance of privatization proceeds to 1934-37 Germany can hardly 
be denied, particularly in comparison to modern privatizations like those applied 
recently in the European Union countries. However, it is worth noting that the 
general orientation of the Nazi economic policy was the exact opposite of that of  
the EU countries in the late 1990s: Whereas the modern privatization in the EU has 
been parallel to liberalization policies, in Nazi Germany privatization was applied 
within a framework of increasing control of the state over the whole economy 
through regulation and political interference. 
 
V. Visions of Nazi privatization in the economic literature of the late 1930s and 
1940s 
  
Privatization policy in Germany was discussed in the late 1930s and the 1940s 
in academic works such as Poole (1939), Guillebaud (1939), Stolper (1940), 
Sweezy (1941), Merlin (1943), Neumann (1942, 1944), Nathan (1944a), 
Schweitzer (1946), and Lurie (1947). Most of these works analyzed these issues 
within the framework of the controversy between two positions (Schweitzer, 1946, 
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pp. 99-100) that held either that private property and property rights were left 
untouched by the Nazis, or that the Nazis destroyed such rights.  
 On one hand, the intense growth of governmental regulations on markets, which 
heavily restricted economic freedom, suggests that the rights inherent to private 
property were destroyed. As a result, privatization would be of no practical 
consequences since the state assumed full control of the economic system (e.g. 
Stolper, 1940, p. 207). On the other hand, the activities of private business 
organizations and the fact that big business had some power seemed to be grounds 
for inferring that the Nazis promoted private property. Privatization, in this 
analysis, was intended to promote the interests of the business sectors that 
supported the Nazi regime, as well as the interests of the Nazi elites (e.g. Sweezy, 
1941, pp. 27-28; Merlin, 1943, p. 207; Neumann, 1944, p. 298).  
 Guillebaud (1939, p. 55) stresses that the Nazi regime wanted to leave 
management and risk in business in the sphere of private enterprise, subject to the 
general direction of the government. Thus, “the State in fact divested itself of a 
great deal of its previous direct participation in industry….But at the same time 
state control, regulation and interference in the conduct of the economy affairs was 
enormously extended.” Guillebaud (1939, p. 219) felt that National Socialism was 
opposed to state management, and saw it as a “cardinal tenet of the Party that the 
economic order should be based on private initiative and enterprise (in the sense of 
private ownership of the means of production and the individual assumption of 
risks) though subject to guidance and control by state.” This can be seen as the 
basic rationale for privatization in Guillebaud’s analysis. 
 Perhaps the most suggestive work on privatization in Nazi Germany was 
Maxine Sweezy’s (1941) The Structure of the Nazi Economy. On one hand, Sweezy 
endorses the idea that Nazi privatization was a policy applied “In return for 
business assistance” (Sweezy, 1941, p. 27). In Sweezy’s view, the Nazis paid back 
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industrialists who supported Hitler’s accession to power and his economic policies 
“by restoring to private capitalism a number of monopolies held or controlled by 
the state” (p. 27). This policy implied a large-scale program by which “the 
government transferred ownership to private hands” (p. 28).  
 On the other hand, to explain Nazi privatization Sweezy puts forward an 
interesting hypothesis consistent with the macroeconomic design of Nazi economic 
policy. She argues that one of the main objectives for the privatization policy was 
to stimulate the propensity to save, since a war economy required low levels of 
private consumption.30 High levels of savings were thought to depend on inequality 
of income, which would be increased by inequality of wealth. This, according to 
Sweezy “was thus secured by ‘reprivatization’…. The practical significance of the 
transference of government enterprises into private hands was thus that the 
capitalist class continued to serve as a vessel for the accumulation of income.” 
(Sweezy, 1941, p. 28). 
 Consistent with Sweezy’s approach, Merlin (1943, p. 207) states that the Nazi 
Party was looking not only for business support, but also for increased control over 
the economy. In this way, privatization was seen as a tool in the hands of the Nazi 
Party to “facilitate the accumulation of private fortunes and industrial empires by 
its foremost members and collaborators.” This would have intensified 
centralization of economic affairs and government in an increasingly narrow group 
that Merlin termed “the national socialist elite.” (p. 207). 
 Early analysis of Nazi privatization explicitly stated that German privatization 
of the 1930s was intended to benefit the wealthiest sectors and enhance their 
economic position, in search of their political support. This interpretation reflected 
the predominant idea that big industrialists strongly supported the Nazi Party and 
                                                 
30 In fact, private consumption in terms of national income decreased from 83 per cent in 1932 to 
59 per cent in 1938 [Overy, 1982, p. 34]. 
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Hitler’s accession to power. The next section discusses these issues. Thus far, 
regardless of specific interpretations, it is clear that a wide privatization policy was 
applied in Germany in the mid-thirties and that analysts and researchers of the time 
recognized its importance. Even international organizations such as the League of 
Nations took note,31 and international interest was reflected in a change in the 
English language: in the mid-1930s the German term ‘Reprivatisierung’, and the 
associated concept, were brought into English in the term ‘reprivatization’ (Bel, 
2006). 
 
VI. Analyzing the Objectives of Nazi Privatization 
 
Contemporary economic literature has shown the multiplicity of objectives 
targeted with privatization policies (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, 1991). The analysis 
of privatization usually identifies three types of objectives in the recent 
privatization processes: (1) Ideological motivations; (2) Political motivations; (3) 
Pragmatic (economic) motivations. 
 
VI.a. Ideological motivations: Did the Nazi Government use privatization to 
change the way in which society was organized? Privatization was not included 
either in the Nazi Party electoral manifestos or in the successive revisions of the 
Economic and Social Program approved in 1920 by the Nazi Party.32 In fact, 
among the 25 points in this Program, points 13 and 14 included proposals of 
                                                 
31 Thus, the 1937/38 League of Nations report on banking and finance conditions commented that 
“The process known as ‘reprivatisation’ of the big Berlin banks by the purchase on behalf of 
private persons of their shares held by the State of public corporations since the reconstruction 
following the 1931 crisis was completed by the end of 1937.” [League of Nations, 1938, p. 92] 
32 According to Stolper (1940, p. 231), “this program has remained the spiritual foundation of the 
movement. It is being taught in every school, referred to in all training courses of all the various 
units of the party. It constitutes, together with Mein Kampf by Hitler, the directing force of the 
intellectual concept and trend of the party” 
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nationalization of trusts and banks (Stolper, 1940, p. 232; Barkai, 1990, p. 23). 
Proposals of nationalization were also recurrent in the Nazi electoral manifestos. 
Hence, privatizing State-owned firms was contrary to the Nazi economic program 
and election proposals.  
Nazi policy was heavily dependent on Hitler’s decisions. Hitler made no 
specific comments on nationalization or denationalization in Mein Kampf. Even if 
Hitler was an enemy of free market economies (Overy, 1994, p. 1), he could by no 
means be considered a sympathizer of economic socialism or nationalization of 
private firms (Heiden, 1944, p. 642). The Nazi regime rejected liberalism, and was 
strongly against free competition and regulation of the economy by market 
mechanisms (Barkai, 1990, p. 10). Still, as a social Darwinist, Hitler was reluctant 
to totally dispense with private property and competition (Turner, 1985a, p. 71; 
Hayes, 1987, p. 71). Hitler’s solution was to combine autonomy and a large role for 
private initiative and ownership rights within firms with the total subjection of 
property rights outside the firm to State control. As Nathan pointed out (1944a, p. 
5) “It was a totalitarian system of government control within the framework of 
private property and private profit. It maintained private enterprise and provided 
profit incentives as spurs to efficient management. But the traditional freedom of 
the entrepreneur was narrowly circumscribed.” In other words, there was private 
initiative in the production process, but no private initiative was allowed in the 
distribution of the product. Owners could act freely within their firms, but faced 
tight restrictions in the market. 
Given this combination of private ownership within the firm and extreme State 
control outside it, the core question here is whether Hitler was against public 
property or ideologically favorable to privatization. On this issue, it is interesting to 
note two interviews in May and June 1931, in which Hitler explained his aims and 
plans to Richard Breiting, editor of the Leipziger Neueste Nachrichten, on 
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condition of confidentiality (Calic, 1971, p. 11). With respect to his position with 
regard to private ownership, Hitler explained that “I want everyone to keep what he 
has earned subject to the principle that the good of the community takes priority 
over that of the individual. But the State should retain control; every owner should 
feel himself to be an agent of the State….The Third Reich will always retain the 
right to control property owners.” (Calic, 1971, p. 32-33). Another indication of 
Hitler’s position on the state ownership of the means of production is found in 
Rauschning 33 (1940, pp. 192-3), which reports the following answer by Hitler 
when questioned on socialization: “Why bother with such half-measures when I 
have far more important matters in hand, such as the people themselves?. . .Why 
need we trouble to socialize banks and factories? We socialize human beings.” 
It seems clear that neither the Nazi Party nor Hitler had any ideological devotion 
to private ownership. 34 In their theoretical work on the relationship between 
politicians and firms, Shleifer and Vishny (1994, p. 1,015) stress that anti-market 
governments are compatible with privatization, as long as they can retain control 
over the firms through strong regulation. Nazi privatization in the mid-1930s is 
consistent with Shleifer and Vishny’s proposition 15 (1994, p. 1,021). As suggested 
in Temin (1991), property ownership was instrumental for the Nazis. Hence, it is 
not likely that ideological motivations played a major role as a rationale for Nazi 
privatization. 
 
VI.b. Political motivations. Did the Nazi Government use privatization as a tool 
to obtain political support? The idea that industrialists massively supported the 
                                                 
33 Hermann Rauschning was National Socialist President of the Danzig Senate in 1933-34. He 
was later expelled from the Nazi Party. 
34 In fact, the Nazis used nationalization when they considered it convenient. It is widely known 
the case of the nationalization of two aircraft companies, the Arado and Junkers firms [Homze 
(1976, p. 192-3)]. Less known is the case of the nationalization, for incorporation in the Reich 
Railways Company, of the private Lübeck-Büchener and Brunswick Landes Railways [The 
Economist, November 20, 1937, 129 (4917), p. 369]. 
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Nazi accession to power was widely accepted in the early literature on Hitler’s rise 
to power. Nonetheless, this position was by no means unanimous, and there was 
early opposition to it (e.g. Drucker, 1939, pp. 130-131; Lochner, 1954). Following 
Turner’s more recent work (especially, Turner 1985b) it is generally accepted that 
Hitler only achieved wide support among industrialists when his accession to 
power was seen as unavoidable, from about mid-1932 onwards (Barkai, 1990, p. 
10).  
The fact is that Nazis came into power with limited parliamentary support35 and 
faced great difficulty in establishing stable alliances. In addition, fighting 
unemployment was their top priority, and that required big business cooperation 
(Overy, 1982, p. 40). As stressed in Barkai (1990, p. 114) Hitler did not want to 
frighten the economy. Consequently, the new regime tried hard to break down 
business mistrust (Hayes, 1987, p. 33).  
Once the Nazis came to power, it did not take long for the government to 
produce official statements against nationalization. In 12 February 1933, Mr. Bang, 
an important advisor in the team of the State Secretary of Public Economics, Alfred 
Hugenberg, publicly stated that “The policy of nationalization pursued in the last 
years will be stopped. The state owned enterprises will be transformed again into 
private firms.”36 It is worth noting that Hugenberg was not a member of the Nazi 
Party. In fact, most of the members of the Hitler’s first cabinets were not Nazis. 
Indeed, these cabinet members were representative of the conventional right wing 
parties (before they were suppressed in July 1933) and had strong ties with German 
industrialists.  
                                                 
35 The Nazi Parliamentary Group won 196 out of 584 seats (33.6 per cent) when Hitler was 
appointed Chancellor in January 1933. Subsequent elections in March 1933 gave the Nazi Party 
288 out of 647 seats (44.5 per cent). Data on Nazi parliamentarian representation can be found in 
Lochner (1954, p. 23). 
36 Le Temps, 12 February 1933, p. 2. 
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No doubt, the paradigmatic example of the non-Nazi policymaker with business 
connections was Hjalmar Schacht, head of the Reichsbank and Minister of 
Economy. Schacht was considered the ‘economic fuehrer’ 37 in the first Hitler 
governments. Commenting on his own position in the government, Schacht (1949, 
p. 78) recalled that “Inside the party there was a strong movement to bring more 
and more industries into the hands of the state….Private insurance companies were 
particularly conscious of this threat and they approached me to secure my 
intervention with Hitler in the matter….Here, too, my intervention was successful.” 
It is clear that Schacht’s power was based on a warranty given by Hitler to the big 
business community of friendly economic policies and governmental attitudes 
towards big business interests. 
 It is likely that privatization – as a policy favorable to private property – was 
used as a tool for fostering the alliance between Nazi government and industrialists. 
The government sought to win support for its policies from big business, even 
though most industrialists had been reluctant to support the Nazi party before it 
took power. 
The policies implemented in the financial sector provide evidence of the 
potential of privatization as a tool to enhance political support. Several radical 
officers of the Nazi Party appearing before the Banking Investigation Committee, 
which analyzed the reorganization of the banking sector, proposed the 
nationalization of the entire banking system in accordance with the Nazi Economic 
and Social Program and the Nazi Electoral Manifesto. On the other side, the top 
                                                 
37 Schacht’s power was at its peak at the time of his public speeches in 1935 defending the 
principles of capitalism: in Königsberg in August (The Economist, August 24 1935, 121 (4800), 
p. 366) and in the Academy for German Law in December (The Economist, December 7 1935, 
121 (4815), p. 1124). The period of Schacht’s maximum strength coincided with the period in 
which most privatization operations were implemented. His power waned in 1937, and came to 
an end when Hermann Göring took control over economic policy. Schweitzer (1964, p. 610) 
contains a detailed chronogram of Schacht’s rise and fall. When his resignation was officially 
announced in November 1937, the reprivatization process was already over. 
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echelons of the Nazi government’s finance offices joined representatives of private 
banks in proposing the strengthening of the regulation of the banking system while 
preserving private property. The hypothesis of an alliance between the Nazi 
leadership and private financial groups to fill governmental positions and save the 
private property system has been stressed in Feldman (2004, p. 21). 
In the end, the Banking Investigation Committee recommended strengthening 
public supervision and control of private banking and introducing new restrictions 
on the creation of credit institutions and the exercise of the banking profession 
(Lurie, 1947, p. 62). These recommendations were implemented through the 
German Bank Act of 1934, which allowed the government to exercise tight control 
over private banks. Regulating banking appeared to the regime as a safe and 
economically sound alternative to proposals by party radicals for controlling 
finance through socialization (James, 1995, p. 291). Afterwards, and consistent 
with the theoretical insights of Shleifer and Vishny (1994), the reprivatization of 
the big commercial banks (Deutsche Bank, Commerz-Bank, and Dresdner-Bank) 
was implemented within the new regulatory framework. The alliance of financial 
interests and top economic echelons in the government held the reprivatization of 
State-owned banks as one of its top priorities. 
The reprivatization of United Steel Works, which put Fritz Thyssen in the 
leading position in the trust, appears to be an example of the use of privatization to 
increase political support. It is worth remembering that Thyssen had been one of 
the only two big industrialists to support the Nazi Party before it became the most 
powerful party in the political scene. Another privatization that can be linked to 
politics is the sale of publicly owned shares of Hamburg-SüdAmerika to a Hamburg 
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syndicate in September 1936, when  the ship-owners of Hamburg had joined the 
Nazi party as a group.38 
Finally, it is clear that the privatization of public services such as work related 
services and social services had political objectives. Several Nazi organizations 
were put in charge of delivering these services. This no doubt fostered support for 
Nazi Party among the beneficiaries of those services. In addition, the Nazi Party 
and its members could use the huge volume of resources passing through these 
programs for political patronage and corruption.39 
 
VI. Pragmatic (economic) motivations. Did the Nazi Government use 
privatization to advance its economic policy? In general terms, the main 
characteristics of Nazi economic policy were (1) the growth of government fiscal 
intervention in the German economy through ambitious programs that involved 
huge public expenditure, and (2) a tightly regulated economy, through more intense 
restrictions and controls on markets. The first shock of public expenditure came in 
public works – particularly the construction of highways – intended to fight 
unemployment. Soon after these projects were in place, expenditure on armaments 
began to grow. According to The Banker (1937, p. 114), increased expenditures 
after 1933/34 were basically taken up by armament programs. These are the main 
policies that explain the evolution of public expenditure in Nazi Germany.   
                                                 
38 Biais and Perotti (2002) analyze the use of privatization to obtain political benefits within a 
framework in which, in order to obtain political support, governments choose between 
privatization and fiscal redistribution. The Nazi macroeconomic policy involved a sharp increase 
in taxation, so there was not much room for using fiscal policy to provide benefits in exchange 
for political support. In fact, fiscal revenues from corporate tax grew by 1,365 per cent between 
1932/33 and 1937/38, whereas total fiscal revenues grew by 110 per cent in the same period. 
[Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1939, p.62)] 
39 Theoretical work on privatization in Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggests that rent 
seeking politicians are more likely to use political patronage with public production, whereas 
contracting out and private production are more likely to provide financial rents. Interestingly 
enough, privatization of public services by franchising to Nazi organizations placed both ways of 
extracting rents in the hands of the Nazi elite. 
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As early as in April 1934, The Economist reported that military expenditure was 
forcing the Minister of Finance to look for new resources. At that time, “Railway 
preference shares are to be sold to the extent of Rm. 224 millions. The Reich 
property, which is to be ‘liquidated’ to yield Rm. 300 millions, is not identified.” 40 
 As mentioned above, 1934/1935 was the last fiscal year for which detailed 
information on the Budget was officially published. Nonetheless, pieces of 
financial information were randomly published in various outlets. Putting together 
these pieces, The Banker (1937, p. 113) published data on public expenditure, 
including its own calculations for 1935/36 and 1936/37 based on official figures. 
Column (1) in table 3 shows these estimates. Column (2) shows data on fiscal 
revenues for these fiscal years. Column (3) shows national income in the year in 
which most of the fiscal year took place.  
  
Table 3. Public Expenditure and Fiscal Revenue 1932/33–1936/37. Thousand million Reichmark 
Fiscal 
year 
(1) Public 
Expenditure
(2) Fiscal 
Revenues 
(2)/(1) in 
%  
(2) – (1) (3) National 
Income 
(2)-(1)/(3)  
in │%│ 
1932/33 6.7 6.65 99.2% - 0.05 45.2 0.0% 
1933/34 9.7 6.85 70.6% - 2.85 46.5 6.1% 
1934/35 12.2 8.22 67.4% - 3.98 52.7 7.6% 
1935/36 16.7 9.65 57.8% - 7.05 58.6 12.0% 
1936/37 18.8 11.49 61.1% - 7.31 64.9 11.3% 
Notes:  Data of Public Expenditure for 1936/37 are estimated.  
Data for National Income refer to the year in which most of the fiscal year takes place 
(e.g. National income of 1932 for fiscal year 1932/33).   
Sources:        (1) Public Expenditure: The Banker (1937, p. 113).  
         (2) Fiscal revenues: Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1939, p.98). 
         (3) National income: Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft (1939, p.61) 
 
 
 
 Table 3 shows that the increase in public expenditure sharply reduced the 
ability of fiscal revenues to cover expenditures. The public deficit as a percentage 
of national income increased to exceptional figures, putting the German Treasury 
                                                 
40 The Economist, April 7, 1934 [118 (4728), p. 763] 
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under intense pressure. Nathan (1944b, p. 41-ff) distinguished between three 
different periods in pre-war Nazi financial policy: (1) The period of short-term 
financing, 1933-35; (2) The period of “Debt Consolidation”, 1935-38; and (3) The 
period of maximum mobilization. Of the two ways of the with debt consolidation, 
one was turning short term debt into long term debt. The second was to obtain 
additional resources from, for instance, the sale of State-owned shares in firms. 
Indeed, it was during Nathan’s second period (1935-38) that the sale of State-
owned shares in most public enterprises took place. 
The Banker made explicit connections between increasing financial constrains 
and the sale of government shares. For instance, when noting that in the fiscal year 
1935/36 the demands on the Treasury increased rapidly because of the huge 
increase in expenditure on armaments, The Banker (1937, p. 112) wrote that “about 
500 million marks was obtained by contributions from the unemployment 
insurance, by more or less forced gifts, and by the sale of government shares” (p. 
112). Later in the same issue (1937, p. 131) the report added that, “Now that the 
control over the banks is complete and final the Government is no longer interested 
in holding their shares. Rising prices have enabled the Government to dispose of 
large amounts of Commerzbank shares and the Golddiskontbank has sold some of 
its Deutsche Bank shares.”  
 The franchising of public services to Nazi organizations shows a similar 
relationship between financial constraints and increasing revenues from 
privatization. Nathan (1944a, p. 322) notes that all these organizations derived most 
of their income from special contributions, collections fees, etc. which fell outside 
the public budgets. Indeed “They were important as a source of public revenue 
since they relieved the government of expenditures which it itself otherwise would 
have had to carry.” Undoubtedly, this was consistent with Nazi fiscal policy, since 
“Without the revenue of these unusual sources, the total amount of public 
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borrowing would necessarily have been considerably higher – a development 
which the government was very eager to avoid” (1944a, p. 331). 
 Nazi economic policy implied a sharp rise in public expenditure. The intensity 
of this increase was unique among the Western capitalist countries in the pre-war 
period. Consistent with this, financial policy was subject to strong restrictions, and 
exceptional methods were devised to obtain resources. In fact, Schacht was 
considered more a financial technician than an economist (Thyssen, 1941, p. 138). 
Privatization was one of the exceptional methods used. In his useful panoramic 
analysis of modern privatization processes, Yarrow (1999) notes the general and 
widespread priority given to financial objectives within this framework of multiple 
and coexisting objectives. Nazi privatization in the mid-thirties was similar to the 
modern experience, in that financial objectives played a central role. 
 
 
VII. Conclusions  
 
Although modern economic literature usually ignores the fact, the Nazi 
government in 1930s Germany undertook a wide scale privatization policy. The 
government sold public ownership in several State-owned firms in different sectors. 
In addition, delivery of some public services previously produced by the public 
sector was transferred to the private sector, mainly to organizations within the Nazi 
Party.  
Ideological motivations do not explain Nazi privatization. However, political 
motivations were important. The Nazi government may have used privatization as a 
tool to improve its relationship with big industrialists and to increase support 
among this group for its policies. Privatization was also likely used to foster more 
widespread political support for the party. Finally, financial motivations played a 
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central role in Nazi privatization. The proceeds from privatization in 1934-37 had 
relevant fiscal significance: No less than 1.37 per cent of total fiscal revenues were 
obtained from selling shares in public firms. Moreover, the government avoided 
including a huge expenditure in the budget by using outside-of-the-budget tools to 
finance the public services franchised to Nazi organizations. 
Nazi economic policy in the mid-thirties went against the mainstream in several 
dimensions. The huge increase in public expenditure programs was unique, as was 
the increase in the armament programs, and together they heavily constrained the 
budget. Exceptional policies were put in place to finance this exceptional 
expenditure, and privatization was just one among them. Nazi Germany privatized 
systematically, and was the only country to do so at the time. This drove Nazi 
policy against the mainstream, which flowed against privatization of state 
ownership or public services until the last quarter of the twentieth century.  
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Table A-1. Privatization proceeds and fiscal revenues in the EU countries (former EU-15) 
1997/2000. Thousand million (billion) US$ 
 
Country Privatization proceeds (1) Fiscal revenues (2) (1) / (2) in % 
Austria 7.13 338.65 2.11% 
Belgium 5.35 454.22 1.18% 
Denmark 4.68 281.24 1.66% 
Finland 8.39 227.61 3.69% 
France 50.63 2,600.10 1.95% 
Germany 18.97 2,915.75 0.65% 
Greece 11.62 237.05 4.90% 
Ireland 6.31 118.25 5.34% 
Italy 74.41 2,335.85 3.19% 
Luxembourg 0.00 29.28 0.00% 
Netherlands 3.87 654.98 0.59% 
Portugal 14.09 229.04 6.15% 
Spain 26.35 1,026.71 2.57% 
Sweden 12.71 455.98 2.79% 
United Kingdom 4.54 2,023.55 0.22% 
  
Sources: Author’s elaboration, based on:  
(1) Privatization proceeds: Clifton, Comín and Díaz Fuentes (2003, p. 95).   
(2) Fiscal revenues: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2005). 
 
